Editor's Note
Welcome to the fifth edition of Swarmwatch Signals.
This week, SpaceX is preparing to send Starship into orbit and deploy 26 Starlink V3 satellites. If successful, the mission would connect Starship’s development directly to the next phase of the Starlink constellation.
Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence says Russian forces have already used Rassvet satellites for communications over Ukraine, although only for limited periods. The disclosure comes as the UK acknowledges operating approximately 1,000 Starshield terminals and the RAF establishes a squadron dedicated to acting against threats in space.
Elsewhere, eight Qianfan satellites have reached orbit aboard a commercial Chinese rocket launched from the sea, while Telesat and Orange have activated the first European gateway for the planned Lightspeed constellation.
These developments show that orbital competition is no longer only about the number of satellites launched. It increasingly involves terminals, gateways, military units, launch systems and the ability to control how satellite services are used.
Swarmwatch Signals selects a small number of developments that deserve attention and considers what they could mean for space infrastructure, security and resilience.
For constellation sizes, launch histories and orbital activity, visit Swarmwatch.
🛰️ The Orbital Picture
Starship prepares for its first orbital flight
SpaceX is preparing to launch Starship’s fourteenth test flight no earlier than 28 September, pending regulatory approval and final readiness.
Unlike previous Starship tests, the upper stage is intended to enter orbit and complete six circuits of Earth during a mission lasting approximately ten hours.
The flight is expected to deploy 26 Starlink V3 satellites into an initial orbit approximately 275 kilometres above Earth. The satellites would then use their own propulsion to raise their orbits and join the Starlink constellation.
SpaceX says the larger V3 design will provide considerably more network capacity than the V2 Mini satellites launched aboard Falcon 9.
Neither stage will return to the launch site. The Super Heavy booster will attempt a controlled landing in the Gulf of Mexico, while the Starship upper stage is expected to re-enter over the Pacific Ocean. SpaceX intends to collect further data about engine relighting and heat-shield performance.
Why it matters: Reaching orbit and deploying satellites into the operational constellation would move Starship into a new stage of development.
Starship is central to SpaceX’s plans for launching larger Starlink satellites at a much higher rate. SpaceX has already said that future dedicated Starlink missions from Florida will move from Falcon 9 to Starship.
The flight remains experimental. A successful deployment would be a major milestone, but it would not demonstrate the rapid turnaround or full reusability on which SpaceX’s longer-term plans depend.
The schedule has already moved from 22 to 28 September and could change again.
Sources: SpaceX, Ars Technica and Space.com
A commercial sea launch carries eight Qianfan satellites
Orienspace’s Gravity-1 rocket launched eight Qianfan broadband satellites and one technology-test spacecraft from a mobile platform in the East China Sea on 16 September.
The payload exceeded three tonnes and was placed into orbit at an altitude of approximately 800 kilometres.
Chinese state reporting described the mission as the first mobile sea launch used to deploy satellites for a low Earth orbit broadband constellation. It was Gravity-1’s third flight and the first time the rocket had carried Qianfan satellites.
Gravity-1 is a commercial solid-fuelled rocket designed to carry multiple satellites. Orienspace says it intends to fly the vehicle approximately once every two months, although it has not yet demonstrated that launch cadence.
Why it matters: Qianfan will need access to several launch systems if it is to grow from hundreds to thousands of satellites.
Using Gravity-1 gives the programme another commercial route to orbit and demonstrates that a sea-launched rocket can carry a substantial batch of flat-panel constellation satellites.
Sea launches can also offer greater flexibility in selecting flight paths and orbital inclinations. Their value to Qianfan will depend on whether Orienspace can repeat the mission reliably and increase its launch rate.
📡 Signals
Ukrainian intelligence reports operational use of Rassvet
Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence says Russian forces used satellites from the Rassvet constellation for communications over Ukraine for “several hours” by the end of July.
The claim was made by a senior Ukrainian intelligence official in comments to Janes. No technical evidence was published with the report, and Bureau 1440 has not publicly responded to the allegation.
Ukraine’s intelligence service said the network could potentially support real-time data transmission and communications with reconnaissance or strike drones. It did not say it had confirmed that Rassvet was used to control drones or support a particular operation.
Russia launched the first 16 operational-series Rassvet satellites in March, followed by another 16 in July. Six earlier experimental satellites had also been placed in orbit.
The reported use appears to concern the first group launched in March. It does not contradict tracking reports showing that several satellites from the July deployment experienced difficulty raising their orbits.
Why it matters: Even intermittent coverage could have military value. A small constellation does not need to provide continuous consumer broadband to support communications during selected operations.
The report also suggests that Rassvet may be entering limited operational use before the complete network is deployed. Its significance will depend on the number of working satellites, the availability of compatible terminals and whether Russia can maintain the launch cadence required for broader coverage.
For now, the strongest supported claim is that Ukrainian intelligence recorded several hours of Russian satellite communications over Ukraine. The proposed connection to drone operations remains a potential use rather than a demonstrated one.
Source: Janes
UK reveals the scale of its military SpaceX network
The UK Ministry of Defence has disclosed that it operates approximately 1,000 Starshield terminals and 500 standard Starlink terminals.
The figures were provided to Reuters following a freedom of information request.
The MoD reported spending approximately £13 million on Starshield equipment and airtime, alongside £16.5 million on standard Starlink. Combined expenditure on the two SpaceX services was therefore £29.5 million, or approximately $40 million.
Reuters reports that Britain is the first country outside the United States to acknowledge publicly that it uses Starshield, SpaceX’s military and government-focused service.
The MoD said the UK service uses the existing Starlink satellite constellation and supporting infrastructure, but operates through dedicated terminals and separate ground-based network gateways.
Why it matters: Commercial low Earth orbit connectivity gives the Armed Forces access to a large and rapidly deployable communications network.
It also creates dependence on a foreign commercial provider. Questions about contractual control, data routing, access during a crisis and the ability to move between networks become part of national resilience.
Starshield does not replace the UK’s sovereign Skynet military communications system. It adds another layer alongside Skynet, standard Starlink and the UK’s investment in Eutelsat OneWeb.
Sources: Reuters reporting carried by Investing.com and the UK government’s space-procurement overview
RAF forms a squadron to act against threats in space
The Royal Air Force has formed No. III Space Effects Squadron, its first unit dedicated to taking action against threats to UK satellites and space services.
Announced on 23 September, the squadron sits within UK Space Command and brings together specialist personnel from across the Armed Forces.
It will operate alongside No. I Space Operations Squadron, which supports the monitoring of orbital activity, and No. II Space Warning Squadron, which provides missile warning and space tracking.
The RAF describes the new unit’s role as disrupting, degrading and denying hostile activity. It will support defensive and offensive space operations, including electronic warfare and measures intended to counter anti-satellite capabilities.
The RAF has not disclosed the squadron’s size, location, equipment or specific operational capabilities.
Why it matters: The new squadron marks a shift from observing and warning about threats towards developing the ability to act against them.
That does not necessarily mean physically destroying satellites. Electronic warfare could include interfering with an adversary’s communications or preventing access to satellite services without damaging the spacecraft.
Such actions avoid creating orbital debris, but they can still be escalatory and difficult to attribute.
The announcement comes alongside £880 million in planned UK investment between 2026/27 and 2029/30 for space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and space-control activities.
Sources: Royal Air Force, Janes and Breaking Defense
🔭 The Bigger Picture
Space power increasingly depends on systems governments do not own
The UK’s use of Starshield and Russia’s development of Rassvet reflect two different approaches to the same problem.
Military operations increasingly depend on large amounts of satellite connectivity. Traditional government-owned communications satellites remain important, but relatively small fleets in high orbits cannot always provide the capacity, coverage and resilience offered by distributed networks in low Earth orbit.
Russia is attempting to build a domestic constellation that could support both civilian and military users. Britain is combining sovereign systems with services purchased from commercial operators.
Neither model offers complete independence.
Rassvet depends on Russia’s ability to manufacture satellites, obtain components, produce terminals and sustain frequent launches. The UK’s layered approach provides access to several networks, but some of the most capable infrastructure remains under foreign or commercial control.
No. III Space Effects Squadron adds another element. The UK is not only buying communications services. It is organising personnel and capabilities around protecting access to space while potentially denying those services to an adversary.
The important measure of space power is therefore broader than the number of satellites a country owns.
It includes launch capacity, ground stations, user terminals, secure software, trained personnel, commercial relationships and the authority to decide where and how a network can be used.
A country may operate few satellites of its own and still possess substantial space-enabled capability. It may also appear well supplied while remaining dependent on decisions made elsewhere.
👀 One Thing I’m Watching
Telesat activates its first European Lightspeed gateway
Orange and Telesat have commissioned the first European ground gateway for the planned Telesat Lightspeed constellation.
The gateway is located at Orange’s teleport in Bercenay-en-Othe, France. Orange will also provide terrestrial connectivity to Telesat’s planned network point of presence in Paris.
The infrastructure is intended to support secure, low-latency connectivity for enterprise and government customers using Lightspeed’s planned initial constellation of 225 satellites.
The gateway has been installed and commissioned, but the constellation itself remains under development. Commercial Lightspeed service has not begun.
Why I’m watching: Satellite networks depend on terrestrial infrastructure to move information between spacecraft, operators and customers.
Installing a European gateway before the constellation is operational suggests Telesat is moving from financing and design into practical deployment preparation.
The next meaningful milestones will be satellite production, launch and confirmation that the ground network can support operational service.
Source: Orange and Telesat
📚 Worth Reading
ESA Space Environment Report 2026
ESA’s latest Space Environment Report examines satellite activity, orbital debris, spacecraft break-ups and compliance with disposal guidelines.
The 2026 edition adds an assessment of casualty risks associated with spacecraft re-entry. It also discusses atmospheric pollution, active debris removal and the growing role of in-orbit servicing.
One of its central arguments is that the space sector needs to move away from treating satellites as disposable objects. Refuelling, repair, reuse and more reliable end-of-life disposal could eventually form part of a more circular orbital economy.
The report provides useful context for evaluating constellation growth beyond headline launch numbers.
🌐 Go Deeper
The Sky Is Full
I’ve been working on an eight-part documentary podcast about how satellite constellations are reshaping communications, geopolitics and conflict.
The Sky Is Full travels from Ukraine’s battlefields and Chinese launch sites to Cold War bunkers and Silicon Valley boardrooms, tracing how low Earth orbit became some of the world’s most consequential infrastructure.
The trailer is out now.
Swarm: The Rise of Megaconstellations and the Battle for Low Earth Orbit
My forthcoming book examines the larger story behind many of the developments covered by Swarmwatch Signals: how commercial satellite networks became strategic infrastructure, why governments increasingly depend on them, and what their expansion means for competition and conflict in orbit.
Swarm will be published by Potomac Books in January 2027.
Did You Know? The UK has disclosed approximately twice as many Starshield terminals as standard Starlink terminals.
The reported expenditure does not follow the same pattern. The Ministry of Defence said it spent about £13 million on 1,000 Starshield terminals and airtime, compared with £16.5 million for 500 standard Starlink terminals.
This does not mean Starshield is cheaper per terminal. The totals may cover different equipment, service periods and airtime arrangements, so dividing expenditure by terminal numbers would produce a misleading comparison.
What the figures do show is that military-focused commercial satellite connectivity is no longer a small experiment within UK defence.
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Till next time,
Jay
Swarmwatch Signals
