Swarmwatch Signals: Issue 07

This week, a Russian military satellite made a deliberate close approach to a commercial radar-imaging spacecraft operated by ICEYE.

Public tracking cannot tell us exactly why it happened. That uncertainty is part of the story. The same technologies that allow a spacecraft to inspect, repair or remove another satellite can also be used to observe it, disrupt its work or simply apply pressure.

That tension runs throughout this edition. The UK is backing a spacecraft designed to capture two inactive satellites, while the United States continues building a distributed military network in low Earth orbit.

Taken together, these stories show why orbital manoeuvring is becoming such an important part of the space-security picture.

Swarmwatch Signals does not try to cover everything happening in orbit. Instead, it selects a small number of developments worth examining and considers what they may mean for space infrastructure, security and resilience.

For a closer look at individual constellations, launch histories and orbital activity, visit Swarmwatch.

A Russian military spacecraft has completed an unusually close approach to ICEYE-X36, a commercial synthetic-aperture radar satellite.

Cosmos 2612 began a series of manoeuvres on 30 September. These gradually brought it into the same orbital plane as ICEYE-X36 and synchronised aspects of the two spacecraft’s orbits.

By 16 October, the satellites were separated by only a few kilometres. LeoLabs subsequently reported that Cosmos 2612 moved to within approximately 500 metres of ICEYE-X36, changed its relative position around the satellite and remained nearby before beginning to move away.

Some calculations based on public orbital elements have produced smaller estimates. Those figures should be treated cautiously. Gaps and uncertainties in the publicly available data make the precise minimum separation difficult to establish.

What can be established is that this was not an accidental conjunction. Cosmos 2612 used a sequence of controlled manoeuvres to approach ICEYE-X36.

ICEYE operates a constellation of radar satellites capable of collecting imagery at night and through cloud cover. The company supplies imagery to Ukraine, although it has not been confirmed that ICEYE-X36 itself supports Ukrainian operations.

There is no public evidence that ICEYE-X36 was struck or disrupted. ICEYE told Axios that it was aware of the situation and was monitoring it closely.

Cosmos 2612 has since raised its orbit and is moving away.

Russia has not publicly explained the operation. Inspection, intelligence collection, signalling and rehearsal are all possible interpretations, but none has been confirmed.

That ambiguity is precisely what makes the encounter significant.

Sources: Ars Technica, Via Satellite and Marco Langbroek’s orbital analysis

The UK government has selected ClearSpace UK to develop a national active-debris-removal mission.

Backed by more than £60 million in government funding, the mission is intended to capture two inactive UK-licensed satellites and lower them towards the atmosphere for destructive re-entry.

The spacecraft is planned for launch from SaxaVord Spaceport in Scotland in 2029, with both removals expected to be completed by 2032.

Capturing an inactive satellite is considerably harder than docking with a cooperative spacecraft. The targets were not designed with docking ports, navigational markers or mechanisms to help another vehicle secure them.

ClearSpace will therefore need to demonstrate autonomous navigation, close-proximity operations and robotic capture around objects whose attitude and condition may be uncertain.

The spacecraft is also intended to be refuelable. If that capability works as planned, it could allow the vehicle or its successors to support missions beyond the first two removals.

The government describes the project as a world-first because a single spacecraft is intended to dispose of more than one existing satellite. Whether the programme ultimately becomes a repeatable commercial service remains to be seen.

Source: UK government

A Falcon 9 launched 21 data-transport satellites for the US Space Development Agency on 10 October.

The satellites form part of the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture, a low-Earth-orbit network designed to provide secure communications and move data between military users, sensors and missile-tracking satellites.

Unlike traditional military architectures built around a small number of large and expensive spacecraft, the system distributes its functions across a growing number of smaller satellites.

The logic is resilience. Losing one satellite should have less effect on the wider network, while optical links can allow data to travel between spacecraft before being sent to users on the ground.

Proliferation does not make the architecture invulnerable. It does, however, make disruption a more complicated task and reduces dependence on a handful of particularly valuable spacecraft.

The latest launch continues a wider shift in government space systems towards networks that more closely resemble commercial constellations.

Source: Space.com

A spacecraft doesn't need to collide with another satellite to affect its operations.

A close approach can consume the target operator’s attention, create uncertainty and potentially force a decision about whether to manoeuvre. Any avoidance manoeuvre consumes fuel and may interrupt planned operations.

It can also demonstrate capability. Reaching another satellite requires tracking, propulsion, guidance and control accurate enough to synchronise two objects moving through orbit at several kilometres per second.

Those same capabilities are essential for peaceful missions.

The UK debris-removal spacecraft will need to approach and capture inactive satellites. NASA’s recently launched SSPICY mission will inspect unresponsive objects. Commercial operators are developing vehicles for refuelling, repair and life extension.

The technology itself does not explain the operator’s intention.

That overlap between servicing and counterspace operations is likely to become more important as rendezvous and proximity capabilities spread. An approaching spacecraft might be there to help, inspect, intimidate or interfere. Other evidence will be needed to distinguish between them.

Removing two inactive satellites will demonstrate technology, but it will make little difference to the overall debris population.

The more important question is what comes afterwards.

A sustainable debris-removal service needs customers willing to pay, spacecraft capable of handling different targets and regulatory arrangements covering liability, ownership and re-entry.

The UK mission may help establish some of that technical and regulatory experience. Its proposed refuellable design also suggests an ambition to move beyond a single demonstration.

If the programme ends after two removals, it will still provide valuable flight heritage. If it creates a vehicle and supply chain capable of supporting repeated missions, its impact could be considerably greater.

Sources: UK government and UK Space Strategy

A new research preprint examines approximately 25,000 observed tracks involving 5,118 individual satellites.

The researchers compared the observations with the brightness threshold recommended by the International Astronomical Union Centre for the Protection of the Dark and Quiet Sky from Satellite Constellation Interference.

In their dataset, Starlink satellites exceeded the recommended limit on roughly a quarter of geometrically possible passes. Guowang satellites exceeded it on more than half, while OneWeb exceeded it on around one in twenty.

The researchers estimate that approximately one in three 30-second twilight exposures at the Vera C. Rubin Observatory could contain a satellite trail.

There is an important caveat. The paper is a preprint and says it is under revision with Nature Astronomy. Its findings have therefore not yet completed that journal’s publication process.

The comparison between operators is nevertheless useful. It suggests that satellite design and operational choices can make a meaningful difference to brightness.

Read the paper on arXiv

The Sky Is Full

I’ve been working on an eight-part documentary podcast about how satellite constellations are reshaping communications, geopolitics and conflict.

The Sky Is Full travels from Ukraine’s battlefields and Chinese launch sites to Cold War bunkers and Silicon Valley boardrooms, tracing how low Earth orbit became some of the world’s most consequential infrastructure.

The trailer is out now.

Listen to The Sky Is Full + The Sky Is Full site

Swarm: The Rise of Megaconstellations and the Battle for Low Earth Orbit

My forthcoming book examines the larger story behind many of the developments covered by Swarmwatch Signals: how commercial satellite networks became strategic infrastructure, why governments increasingly depend on them, and what their expansion means for competition and conflict in orbit.

Swarm will be published by Potomac Books in January 2027.

Read more about Swarm

💡 Did You Know? An inactive satellite is often described as an “unprepared” target when it was not designed to be captured or serviced.

It may have no docking interface or visual markers to guide an approaching spacecraft. It may also be tumbling, damaged or unable to communicate.

That means a removal vehicle must first inspect the target, determine its movement and find a safe way to secure it without creating additional debris.

Source: UK Space Agency

Till next time,

Jay

Swarmwatch Signals